"The Good Mother":
The Limits of Reproductive
Accountability and Genetic Choice
R. A L T A C H A R O A N D
K A R E N H. R O T H E N B E R G

-Dree Walker Lampley has discovered the mean
ing of the feminist truism that the personal is the political. A
Southern Californian television news anchor, with a genetic
condition that causes her to suffer missing or fused toes and
fingers, Bree Walker Lampley became the subject of public dis
cussion about whether it was appropriate to conceive a child
who faced a 50-50 chance of inheriting the same condition. In
a breathtaking display of insensitivity, a local radio talk show
host held a two-hour call-in discussion of Walker Lampley's de
cision on the issue. At the time, Walker Lampley was seven
months pregnant.
Underlying the controversy surrounding the talk show, and
indeed the amorphous fears surrounding the Human Genome
Project, is the perpetual question of accountability. Should
women be held accountable for the size, health, and demo
graphic makeup of future generations? The question is asked in
terms of women's accountability because it is they who con
ceive, gestate, and give birth to these generations. Governments
have often looked to women's reproductive decisions as the me
diating mechanism for enforcing a social policy on population
size and structure. In many ways, fertile women are viewed as
having the "last clear chance" (in the jargon of tort law) to per
petuate or stifle a genetic trait. The question is, does the public
have a legitimate interest in that choice? If so, are women there
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fore accountable to the public for the choices they make? Are
they accountable to their families and to the children with ge
netic disorders they bring into the world?
The question is more than hypothetical. A 1990 general
population survey revealed that 39% feel that "every woman
who is pregnant should be tested to determine if the baby has
genetic defects," and 22% believe that, regardless of what they
would want for themselves, "a woman should have an abortion
if the baby has a serious genetic defect" (Singer, 1991). Nearly
10% stated they believe that poor women should be required to
abort fetuses with genetic disorders rather than be allowed to
turn to government assistance for the child's rearing and health
care. With regard to specific disorders, surveys reveal that 95%
of women would choose abortion following prenatal diagnosis
of severe mental retardation, and 60% for moderate mental re
tardation, blindness, or paraplegia (Benn et al., 1985; Faden et
al., 1987; Golbus et al., 1979).
On the other hand, parents of children with a genetic disor
der such as cystic fibrosis are more tolerant. They tend to sup
port both the choice to have more children with genetic disor
ders and the choice to terminate pregnancy upon request. For
example, a substantial majority support the right to legal abor
tion in the first trimester following diagnosis of any of the
aforementioned disorders, and 58% would themselves have an
abortion in the face of a fetus with severe mental retardation.
On the other hand, only 40% would themselves abort a fetus
with a disorder leading to death before age five; 35%, a fe
tus predicted to develop moderate mental retardation; 20%, a
fetus affected with cystic fibrosis; and 17%, a fetus predicted
to develop a severe, incurable disease with onset at age forty
(Wertz et al., 1991). This disparity between tolerating and
choosing abortion among those with personal experience relat
ing to a child born with a genetic disorder highlights the in
tensely personal nature of these decisions, and the inability
of those most closely associated with such circumstances to
agree upon bright-lined rules concerning responsible reproduc
tive behavior.
This chapter first examines the question of personal ac
countability to one's family or children for reproductive deci
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sions. It concludes that while arguments can be made for moral
accountability, legal accountability is inappropriate for the fol
lowing reasons: First, conundrums concerning causation and
calculation of damages make legal remedies difficult to fashion.
Second, legal accountability adds little to the already significant
emotional and financial forces constraining reproductive choice
in the face of probable genetic disorder. Finally, legal accounta
bility is premised on the notion that there are indeed objective
standards measuring those lives that are worth living and those
that are not, an assertion we reject. The chapter then shifts to
the question of whether to hold women publicly accountable
to the community for their reproductive decisions. Following
an analysis of the political and ethical underpinnings of indi
vidual rights and community interests, we conclude that justi
fications to manipulate women's reproductive decisions are fa
tally flawed.

Personal Accountability for
Having a Child with Genetic Disorders
A woman's decision to conceive, abort, or bear a child with
genetic disorders may be subject to questions of personal, as
well as communal, accountability. To argue for such a moral or
legal accountability requires that one view the decision to use
or forego genetic testing as a voluntary and informed choice
that is causally related to some subsequent harm. Those as
sumptions, however, are not well founded.
Nondirective counseling and the informed consent process
are based on our assumption that patient choice is a given. Pro
ponents of reproductive genetic testing argue that with more
genetic information there will be more choice. In fact, the avail
ability of reproductive genetic testing assumes several levels of
choice: whether to have a test, what to learn from the test,
whether to live with uncertainty about its results, and whether
to carry to term. But choice is not that simple. From the pre
conception stage forward, choice free of situational coercion
may be an illusion. As an example, for those women who have
little or no access to prenatal care, genetic services are not avail
able. It is therefore inappropriate to speak of their "choice" to
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forego genetically indicated abortion in the context of assigning
moral or legal blame.
This lack of choice can be illustrated by an examination of
available genetic screening services. Federal funds are available
for limited screening, but not for the abortion that some women
would choose in the light of certain results (Clayton, 1993;
NARAL, 1992). The majority of states place similar limitations
on the use of public funds (NARAL, 1992). And the Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services1 decision upheld the constitutional
ity of prohibiting the use of not only public funds, but also
public facilities or public personnel, for abortion services. Nor
is adequate funding available at the state or federal level to en
sure even minimal health care for every child brought to term
despite prenatal diagnoses of genetic disorder. Thus, even if
screening is available, financial considerations will constrain the
resulting "choices" concerning procreation to the point that
moral and legal responsibility for the outcome may be dubious.
Given those limitations, how can impoverished women be
held personally accountable for reproductive decisions follow
ing genetic counseling? And if such parental responsibility
could be assigned, should it not be shared by both parents, even
if one parent—the mother—has a constitutionally protected
veto power over decisions concerning abortion?
In an ideal world, carrier screening prior to pregnancy would
be a joint responsibility of the couple. Obtaining information
about probabilities of genetic risk may help to clarify decisionmaking about reproduction, and this is a shared responsibility.
However, once the decision is made to conceive and the egg
has been fertilized, the responsibility shifts exclusively to the
woman. This is so regardless of whether she is the carrier of
the risky genetic link. The decision to conceive, often tied to
the need for genetic connection by both parents, shifts all re
sponsibility related with genetic testing to the mother: she is the
sole subject of testing. In this context, do her husband's or part
ner's desires make her choice less than fully voluntary? If so,
then moral accountability and legal concepts of proximate cause
are obscured.
A further compromise of autonomous decision-making arises
from the problems involved in developing standards of prenatal
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care practice. Providers, who set the standard of care, have a
choice not to provide such testing. But some providers may feel
compelled to encourage women to choose genetic testing, both
out of concern for the outcome of the birth and for fear of legal
liability (U.S. Congress, 1992). Ironically, the more the profes
sion encourages genetic testing and increases consumer expec
tations, the more it will be trapped into providing the services
due to the perceived threat of medical malpractice litigation.
Nonetheless, the profession has the power and the responsi
bility to question risks and benefits of genetic testing in the
broader context of comprehensive pregnancy care. One ex
ample might be to attempt to educate the public as to how
rarely genetic abnormalities significantly impair a baby's health.
Professional conflict of interest can also compromise genetic
counseling. The counseling session is often scheduled just prior
to the genetic testing itself so that the woman may sign a con
sent form. There could instead be a greater interval recom
mended between counseling and testing procedures, allowing
the woman to consider fully all of the relevant issues. Genetic
counselors should not feel that they have failed themselves or
their employers if a woman chooses not to be tested, nor should
a woman's decision to forego testing have financial conse
quences for the counselors or their employers.
In addition, genetic counseling should make clear what op
tions a woman will have after receiving test results. Obviously,
there has been increasing concern that as both the use and scope
of genetic testing are expanding, the constitutional right to
choose to terminate a pregnancy is contracting. While protect
ing previability abortion decisions from many state restrictions,
recent Supreme Court decisions still tolerate extreme limits on
postviability abortion—even for genetic indications—and per
mit mandatory counseling throughout the pregnancy period as
a condition of obtaining abortion services. This makes it likely
that each state will set its own rules for categorizing those con
ditions that justify postviability abortion. Some states will al
low such abortions for "fetal defect," congenital anomalies and
the like, but as reproductive testing increases, legislation will
have to refine and adjust those definitions. For example, some
genetic aberrations do not cause significant disorder of physical
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health, but can create cosmetic problems that are likely to cause
disorder of mental health due to societal reactions to the child's
appearance. Whether they will constitute a "defect" poses a
problem of enormous emotional and political dimensions.
The Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Penn
sylvania v. Casey7- also sheds light on the permissible range of
State restrictions on abortion that may affect the use of genetic
services. The Supreme Court held that mandatory counseling
requirements are permissible expressions of state interest in the
protection of fetal life and in preference for childbirth over abor
tion, so long as they do not become an undue burden on a
woman's right to obtain previability abortions, which the court
did reaffirm as an aspect of protected personal liberty. Manda
tory counseling introduces the opinions of the physician, the
genetic counselor, and, in the case of counseling directives
written by the state, the opinions of the state legislature and
regulators as well. The Casey decision specifically upholds the
constitutionality of state measures designed to express a state
preference for childbirth over abortion. This includes any form
of counseling that presents objectively accurate information,
even if it is an unbalanced presentation, so long as the coun
seling does not amount to an "undue burden." The politics of
the disability rights movement and the anti-abortion movement
could well result in a rash of mandatory counseling provisions
designed to discourage couples from using prenatal diagnosis
for selective termination of pregnancy. Twenty-five states al
ready have mandatory counseling legislation (NARAL, 1992).
As noted above, such provisions might also incorporate state
attempts to define "genetic defect" in a way that manipulates
parental responses to test results. States as diverse as Delaware
and Texas have attempted in the past to limit abortions to cases
of "severe" or "grave" malformations or defects (Clayton,
1993). Under Casey, it would appear states may still attempt to
mandate counseling that characterizes some genetic conditions
as minor and others as severe. A key question in such statutes is
the definition of "severe defect." First, a number of test results
from genetic screening can be ambiguous. Some forms of mo
saicism or triploidy, for example, can be difficult to evaluate.
Even in easily identified disorders, such as cystic fibrosis, the
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expression of the disease can be highly variable, and the state of
the art in treatment is still rapidly evolving. Whether such a con
dition represents a "severe defect" is a matter of interpretation.
Even more important in such a scenario is the identity of the
person making the interpretation of "minor" versus "severe."
In many cases this will be the physician, who will need to certify
that the statutory counseling requirements were met before an
abortion was performed. But the varying attitude toward abor
tion and disability among physicians will certainly make this
judgment itself highly variable, even within a community, let
alone among jurisdictions.
Furthermore, the Rust v. Sullivan3 decision upheld an inter
pretation of Title X regulations that prevents federally funded
clinics from providing any sort of abortion counseling, except
in cases of extreme medical need. Genetic abnormalities of the
fetus would not provide an exception. Even following the re
peal of the federal gag rule under the Clinton-Gore administra
tion (APN, 1993), state legislation may continue to present such
barriers. Louisiana, Missouri, and North Dakota, for example,
have gag rules that mimic the federal restrictions on abortion
counseling in publicly financed facilities (NARAL, 1992).
In addition to such financial and informational barriers, the
profession itself often limits choice by abandoning the care of
the pregnant woman midstream. The medical profession should
ensure that providers making referrals for genetic testing or
providing the genetic testing services also provide abortion ser
vices. The medical profession needs to better coordinate such
services for the woman. At the same time that training in ge
netic testing is expanding, training in abortion services among
residency programs is decreasing. At present, only 15% of the
obstetrics-gynecology residents are trained in abortion proce
dures (O. Nordberg, personal communication, October 1992).
Without such continuity, providers are in fact limiting choice
for women.
Finally, lack of health insurance or information about dis
ability services may also make some women feel they have no
choice but to abort. Such women may worry that failure to
abort will waive future support for the child born with disabili
ties. This fear may be real, as anecdotal reports continue to cir
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culate (albeit rarely) of insurance companies and HMOs threat
ening not to cover expenses for children born by choice with
genetic disorders (U.S. Congress, 1992).
Even if a woman's decision regarding procreation is made
free of the economic and psychological constraints described
above, it is difficult to argue that her decision "caused" any
harm. The questions raised by wrongful birth and wrongful life
actions may help illustrate the point.
A wrongful birth action assumes that by the provider's failure
to disclose information about genetic testing or to provide the
correct test result, the provider caused a harm that requires
compensation to the parents of a child born with a genetic dis
order.4 The harm inflicted in this case is not that the child was
born with a genetic disorder. Rather, the harm is the parents'
deprivation of their right to know about a testable genetic con
dition and to then choose whether to terminate the pregnancy.
On the other hand, most courts have been unwilling to rec
ognize a wrongful life action brought by a child against a pro
vider for the same negligent conduct. In wrongful life, the child
asserts it would have been better never to have been born than
to live with such a severe disorder. Here, the provider has not
actively harmed the child; that harm was caused by the accident
of genetic disorder. The provider's action with respect to the
child was at most a failure to "rescue" the child from a life of
disorder by giving the parents timely information that would
have led to an abortion. But the majority of courts are uncom
fortable with any decision that hints that nonexistence might be
preferable to a life with disability, and thus implicitly reject the
notion that there is a duty to the child to rescue the child from
such a life. Where there is no duty, there can be no cause of
action or legal accountability.
These same considerations militate against legitimizing
wrongful life actions by children against their parents. Unless
one can find a duty to rescue a child from a life with unavoid
able genetic disorders, one cannot hold the parent accountable
for such a birth, even if the parent had sufficient options that
the decision is correctly characterized as a "choice." Certainly,
the goals of tort law are not served by holding mothers (as op
posed to providers) accountable to children for the decision to
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give them life. Even assuming that there is a legitimate public
purpose in reducing the number of children born with signifi
cant genetic disorders, maternal liability is pointless. A woman
who faces the prospect of rearing a child with significant phy
sical problems due to a genetic anomaly already has as much
cautionary information as she needs. Adding the prospect of
financial liability will add little to the already inherent deterring
factors.
Nor does making a mother compensate her child for the pain
incurred by life with genetic disorders serve as more than a
dollar-shifting mechanism, moving money from the parent to
the child. As parents already owe their children a duty of ade
quate support, it adds little to the child's opportunities for medi
cal care. While lodging the suit against the parents' insurers may
offer the prospect of additional dollars flowing into the family,
it hardly seems reasonable to argue that the opportunity for
fraudulent use of the insurance system should be offered to a
suffering child. This is especially true in the light of the real
prospect, on much more solid conceptual grounds, of recovery
against those medical professionals (and their insurers) who
failed to give the information necessary to allow parents to
avoid such a birth.
Finally, there is little "justice" in holding women liable for
choosing to give birth to afflicted children. In the tort system it
is considered just when those who impose nonreciprocal risks
upon others are required to pay for the privilege via compen
sation to the victim. But choosing to rear a child with disorders
is not the imposition of a nonreciprocal risk: the risk is mutual.
The parent risks deep regret at having taken on such a draining
and difficult task. The child risks deep regret at having been
given the opportunity to decide whether this sort of life is better
than nonexistence. Admittedly, only one party can be in a po
sition to make the choice; the as-yet unconceived child cannot
have had any say. But absent an outright eugenic ban on having
children while knowing they will be genetically disabled, the
fact of the matter is that someone must choose; and that person
can only be the parent. Indeed, who better than Bree Walker
Lampley, herself affected by a genetic disorder, to balance the
quality of her child's life against the task of raising such a child?
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Who better than Bree Walker Lampley who has herself experi
enced the kinds of challenges her child will face?

Public Accountability and the Manipulation of
Reproductive Decisions
Women are often subjected to communal, as well as personal,
pressures to shape their reproductive decisions. The justification
is usually based on public health needs. Debates surrounding
modern public health crises, such as the spread of HIV infec
tion, often use an adversarial model focused largely on balanc
ing a presumed conflict between individual rights against com
munity rights. This adversarial vision may well be due to the
decline of widespread communicable disease, the rise of the
medical profession, and the development of an individualistic,
rights-based system of justice (Parmet, 1989). For many public
health issues such as genetic testing and screening, however,
individual interests may be in harmony with public interests,
and thus cooperative models of governmental and individual
action may be more appropriate (Bayer, 1989; Parmet, 1989;
Gostin, Curran, & Clark, 1987; Shilts, 1987).
Historically, governments have viewed preventing disease
and providing medical care as core functions, whether that en
tailed disease reporting and sanitary engineering or quarantine
and health care (Parmet, 1985; Rosenkrantz, 1972). The police
power of the state to take such measures seemed to be based on
long-held doctrines that the use of property (and in turn, indi
vidual action) was limited by the extent to which it created a
public nuisance (Schwartz, 1974). Even after the mid-nineteenth
century, when federal constitutional law guarantees of indi
vidual rights were applied, public health regulation was viewed
as largely immune from constitutional challenge (Tribe, 1988;
Tushnet, 1988; Schwartz, 1974). Even draconian quarantine
measures have been upheld on the basis that "salus populi su
prema lex" (the safety of the people is the supreme law).5 "The
police power was, in short, the public's right to self-survival"
(Parmet, 1989).
Where the public health hazards were "democratic," in other
words, where they cut across class, race, ethnic, and gender
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lines in the community, there was no apparent distinction be
tween individual interests and community interests. When any
member of the community might be the next to fall ill, there
was a common need for defense against the spread of illness and
a common need for compassion for those afflicted. As disease
became viewed more as a sign of moral and spiritual failing,
however, those who imposed restrictions (who assumed them
selves of superior character) began to feel safe from suffering
under such constraints themselves. This was particularly true as
immigration rose, and the foreign-language-speaking, often im
poverished newcomers were viewed as a distinct group bringing
disease and moral impurity with them (Rosenkrantz, 1972; Ro
senberg, 1962).
Courts eventually began to recognize that disease control
could be used abusively to oppress certain economic, racial, and
ethnic minorities, and slowly increased judicial scrutiny of
public health measures (Parmet, 1985). With their newfound
awareness, the courts needed a principle by which to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate public health interests. The medi
calization of health helped to provide that principle: Advances
in bacteriology and sanitation created a scientific basis for public
health policy, and this increased the delegation of public health
powers into the hands of scientifically trained individuals. Over
time this evolved into a policy requiring that individuals follow
the advice of medical professionals lest they be viewed as having
caused their own illness and threatened to make others ill as well
(Parmet, 1985; Rosenkrantz, 1972; Rosenberg, 1962).
As is discussed below, in the area of reproductive health the
courts have often adopted an adversarial model in which they
balance the right of the community to protect itself from in
dividuals whose decisions threaten the health and makeup of
the next generation6 (Bartrum, 1992; Johnsen, 1992; Oberman,
1992) against the individual's right to make reproductive deci
sions free of government coercion.7 Limitation on the commu
nity's right (such as the "right" to require genetic screening) is
found only in those constitutional provisions designed to pro
tect individuals against the excesses of government action: the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches;
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' assurances of due pro
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cess and equal protection under the law; the First Amendment's
protection of the exercise of religion; and the doctrine of fun
damental rights with regard to marriage and procreation (Adel
man, 1981). Yet ironically, it is in the area of reproduction
where harmony may exist between public health and individual
goals, obviating the need for such adversarial analysis (Johnsen,
1992).
As the story of Bree Walker Lampley demonstrates, there is
strong public sentiment against bringing children into the
world knowing they will suffer debilitating and painful illness.
It is, however, the very people who make the choice whether to
bring them into the world who will have the primary respon
sibility for their care and succor. Who better, then, to make the
choice of whether to conceive such a child than the people who
will be there to help the child, financially and emotionally,
through every hospitalization or every physical therapy session.
As the Human Genome Project continues to identify the ge
netic risks we all face in procreation, genetic diagnosis and
counseling will become an aspect of personal health for the
entire community, not just certain members or certain ethnic
groups. The development of tests for cystic fibrosis is particu
larly significant because it heralds an era in which the Caucasian
population is potentially subject to genetic screening and gov
ernmental influence regarding reproductive choices. Until now,
the population groups thus targeted have largely been racial and
ethnic minorities who are still working toward full acceptance
and effectiveness within the political community. The earlier
vision of public health, in which the entire community viewed
itself at general risk, could therefore replace the present vision,
in which only certain groups are at risk. This in turn could re
store the inherent safeguards necessary to make majoritarian
politics a more reasonable way for the community to make
choices concerning the implementation of widespread genetic
screening programs, and reduce the temptation to view public
health models of genetic screening as a battle between commu
nity interests and individual rights.
Unfortunately, this commonality of interests is rarely recog
nized in reproductive politics. Instead, manipulating women's
reproductive choices to meet community perceptions of inter
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generational need is a common phenomenon. While public in
terest in the size and composition of a population is certainly
legitimate, it is not a sufficient justification for choosing the
most interventionist and burdensome restrictions on women's
freedom before seeking alternative solutions. The unusually
interventionist population policies of China and Romania dur
ing the 1970s and 1980s illustrate the problem.
China's policy, still active in the 1990s, combines public in
formation campaigns with tax and employment penalties for
those urban women having more than one child and rural
women having more than two. Those extreme costs are borne
by women despite the fact that other means, such as enhanced
education for girls, are powerful tools to meet public goals of
reduced population growth without burdening women. Some
argue that the urgency of the population growth in China re
quired drastic measures with short-term returns. But the readi
ness with which the Chinese government chose to penalize
women, rather than men, indicates a tendency to view women's
bodies and reproductive propensities as legitimate tools of state
policy.
The Romanian pro-natalist policies were equally interven
tionist. To ensure an adequate supply of labor for the post
war economy, women were forbidden access to contraceptives.
Many were subjected to repeated pregnancy tests at their places
of work. Those found pregnant were required to submit to
follow-up examinations. A miscarriage would result in an in
vestigation to determine if it had been induced. Induced miscar
riage, of course, was a crime—not against the fetus, as is argued
here in the United States, but against the state and the commu
nity. Once again, despite noninterventionist options for meet
ing state policy goals (such as increasing immigration from im
poverished countries who have too many people to support),
the community and government reaction was to look for a
more immediate solution that entailed using women as a means
to state ends.
Here in the United States, the Human Genome Project offers
the prospect of an American-style debate over similar policies.
Despite the rhetoric emphasizing the freedom to have children
as a "fundamental" right (Robertson, 1986, 1983), the United
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States has a long history of eugenic thinking and has often
rushed to mold women's reproductive decisions to meet state
policy goals. In the United States the first eugenic sterilization
law was passed in Indiana in 1907; twenty-nine more would
follow (Reilly, 1991). The 1924 Johnson Act premised immi
gration policy on racist theories about the relative merits of
peoples originating from various parts of Europe. Even Mar
garet Sanger, most influential of the early supporters of access
to birth control, endorsed government offering monetary re
wards to those who would be "unfit" parents if they would
agree to sterilization (Gordon, 1990). More recently, state leg
islatures have begun to seriously debate whether to offer fi
nancial incentives—ranging from threatened withdrawal of
existing social benefits to actual cash grants—to poor or drugaddicted women who choose to have a long-term contraceptive
placed in their bodies. Several courts have ordered women
convicted of child abuse to choose between a jail sentence
and the implantation of the same, long-acting contraceptive
(NYT, 1993; Southwick, 1992; UPI, 1993, 1992). Consistent
with these interventionist approaches to furthering eugenic
policies, American prosecutors and courts have shown a ten
dency to attempt to further the more general state goal of child
protection by way of forced caesarean sections and prosecution
of pregnant addicts.8
With the prospect of better predictive diagnosis of disorder,
there will be the temptation to ask whether we as a nation have
an obligation to future generations to minimize their burdens,
both personal and economic, from the presence of physical or
mental disorders among them. Further, if the decision is made
that such an obligation exists, there will be the temptation to
protect those generations through state interventionist policies.
Though the politics of abortion and the right-to-life movement
probably forestall drastic policies such as that adopted in China,
numerous indirect pressures could be brought to bear. These
range from public service messages, to mandatory genetic test
ing as a condition for the granting of a marriage license, to dif
ferential insurance coverage in the semiprivate and public insur
ance markets.
It might be argued that we owe nothing to future genera
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tions; after all, they consist of people who do not yet exist, may
never exist, and cannot be known to us now as individuals. Fur
thermore, any rights they might have to protection are nonre
ciprocal (because they can do nothing for those of us currently
living) and unenforceable. Indeed, our very actions taken on
their behalf would change the genetic makeup of that future
generation, thus resulting in the paradox of our taking actions
on behalf of individuals who might well cease to exist as a result
of those actions (Parfit, 1984, 1981).
This is an overly simplistic view, though, at least as it is
premised on an atomistic, individualistic view of rights and ob
ligations. Those future people, as yet undefined and unknow
able, may be viewed as part of our moral community because
they will eventually become sentient, actual people, linked to us
in time if not necessarily in space. Looked at collectively, "[so
ciety] is a partnership in all science . . . art . . . virtue, and . . .
perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained
in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between
those who are living, but between those who are living, those
who are dead, and those who are to be born" (Burke, 1959). As
members of a common moral community, we who are living
ought to abide by that implicit social contract because our ob
ligation to the future stems from our debt to the past. One
commentator likens this notion to the Japanese concept of
"on" (roughly, obligation), in which "[o]ne makes payment on
'on' to one's parents by giving equally good or better rearing
to one's children. The obligations one has to one's children
are merely subsumed under 'on' to one's parents" (Benedict,
1946).
Accepting the notion of obligation to future generations does
not, however, imply limitless duties. It would appear excessive
to argue that we who are living owe them more than we owe
ourselves. The reason for their claim on us (that they will be
living) is no more pressing than the claim we make upon our
selves. After all, we too are living. Furthermore, their claims
upon us are still conditioned upon their coming into existence
and choosing to press a claim. Our claims upon ourselves are
not conditional; they are already real. Thus, to some extent,
the claims of members of the current generation upon the re
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sources and liberties of society are superior to those of future
generations.
Given this limitation, one might realistically claim that the
current generation, as a community, owes future generations a
degree of restraint, such as a willingness to refrain from doing
things we know will be significantly harmful. But even this
does not go far enough. After all, we do some significantly
harmful things to ourselves because there are economic or
moral imperatives that drive our decisions. Each new interstate
highway harms the aesthetic and biological values of the terrain
in the name of economic development. To borrow again from
the jargon of tort law, then, we can probably argue that the
current generation owes a duty to refrain from negligent acts
harming future generations. Such negligence can roughly be de
fined as engaging in behaviors that put future generations at an
unreasonable risk of harm in the light of the purported benefits
to be accrued by so acting. And, again as in tort law, we can
look to custom as a rough and ready, though by no means ir
rebuttable, presumption of reasonableness. To the extent that
we treat future generations no differently than we treat our
selves, we have probably fulfilled our obligations. Our own
sense of the fairness of the trade-offs we are making for our
selves provides the best available guide to how future genera
tions are likely to view similar choices. Boiled down to a for
mula, we who are now living probably owe those who will be
living a world perhaps different in kind but not significantly
worse in degree than the one we ourselves occupy. Thus, until
we demand for ourselves a world free of all avoidable genetic,
or indeed physical, disorders, we can hardly be said to owe the
same to future generations.
The question then must be asked, how can or should we cre
ate a world for ourselves and for future generations that mini
mizes our burdens? The answer must be that we make sac
rifices and trade-offs. The public health doctrine of quarantine
requires a sacrifice on the part of the infectious person for the
benefit of the community as a whole. It involves a trade-off
between individual autonomy and community well-being. But
the fact that such a trade-off can be made does not suggest that
it need not meet minimal standards of justice. Vaccination re
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fusals are permitted in order to honor our commitment to prin
ciples of bodily integrity, parental authority, and free exercise
of religion. Tuberculosis isolation is chosen only after proven
medicines and directly observed therapy fail to halt the spread
of infection. And quarantine is completely eschewed when, as
with the epidemic of HIV infection, it would entail an enor
mous, lifelong burden on those who are infected and only mar
ginally improve upon other methods of protecting the public
interest in controlling the spread of the disease.
Similarly, with regard to eugenic uses of information emerg
ing from the Human Genome Project, any sacrifice demanded
of specific individuals for the benefit of current and future gen
erations must meet standards of justice. It is pointless to try to
ensure mtergenerational justice by violating principles of intragenerational justice. Looked at over a continuum of time, such
a trade-off does nothing to further the goal of achieving a
morally responsible community across generations. And that in
turn means a just distribution of sacrifice not only between gen
erations but within generations.
One influential concept of justice discussed among law pro
fessors today is that presented in John Rawls's A Theory of
Justice. Rawls sets out a social contract procedure designed to
arrive at those principles of justice that appear imperative. He
argues that valid principles of justice are those we would agree
upon if each of us were to freely and impartially consider the
situation from a standpoint removed from any actual society
(the "original position") and from which we each bargain with
others similarly rendered impartial by virtue of this "veil of ig
norance." Ignorant of our own biological attributes or position
in whatever sort of society we were to create, Rawls argues that
rational bargainers would inevitably agree upon a certain set of
principles (Rawls, 1971). Concerned with utilitarianism's pro
pensity for looking at maximization of total social good with
little attention to its distribution, Rawls concludes that there is
an inevitable set of principles of justice that any set of rational
negotiators would agree upon. They would, he argues, create a
society based upon permitting the maximum amount of liberty
for each individual compatible with liberty for all, and in which
inequalities in primary social goods (income, rights, opportu
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nities) are allowed only if they ultimately inure to the benefit of
everyone. This latter principle he refines to mean that inequali
ties are tolerable only if they most enhance the position of the
least advantaged.
How can this concept guide decisions about fulfilling our col
lective duty to future generations, particularly with regard to
women's obligations to fashion their reproductive lives to meet
current community goals about the size and structure of future
populations? Although Rawlsian principles of justice cannot be
blindly applied to measure the merit of a particular social pro
gram within an actual society that was not derived through his
thought experiment, it can provide some clue as to whether, in
an ideal world, such a program would be tolerated.
Few could argue with the proposition that women are con
sistently disadvantaged in society. State policies that rely on
control of women's bodies and reproductive decision-making to
promote community preferences for future generations free of
genetic disorder would certainly not appear to maximize each
person's liberty consistent with the liberty of others. Rather,
they single out one group, fertile women, for special restriction
of liberty on behalf of community interests. Further, this cur
tailment of liberty does not inure to the benefit of the least ad
vantaged; rather, it inures to the benefit of the community as a
whole (assuming that having fewer persons with genetic disor
ders in the population really is a benefit) at the expense of the
least advantaged.
The result, then, is that fertile women are conscripted to
serve the reproductive preferences of the leadership in the com
munity. In Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey,9 Justice
Blackmun argues in his dissent that this is an equal protection
violation, created by abortion restrictions:
By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State
conscripts women's bodies into its service, forcing women
to continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of child
birth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal
care. The State does not compensate women for their ser
vices; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty as a mat
ter of course. This assumption—that women can simply
be forced to accept the "natural" status and incidents of
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motherhood—appears to rest upon a conception of wom
en's role that has triggered the protection of the Equal Pro
tection Clause.
The inequalities in reproductive choice should be no more tol
erable when proposed as simply making women accountable to
the public for their reproductive decisions. Such accountability
can range from the seemingly benign mandatory testing for ge
netic conditions (in order to ready a woman to make a decision
about reproduction) to the draconian forced sterilization of the
genetically "unfit," such as was authorized in well over half of
the United States during this very century.
Rawlsian analyses of justice aside, there are good and tradi
tional legal grounds upon which to criticize proposals that make
women accountable to the public for their reproductive deci
sions. Faced with a credible public policy, enforcement mecha
nisms must nonetheless be tested against distinct criteria. First,
does the enforcement infringe upon a fundamental right or a
protected class of persons? If so, does the public policy repre
sent a compelling governmental purpose? Is the chosen enforce
ment mechanism the most effective, least restrictive alternative?
It is worth noting that this legal formulation resembles ele
ments of the Rawlsian principles ofjustice. It tolerates infringe
ments upon individual liberty only when for a compelling pur
pose (here somewhat broader than the Rawlsian concept that
only maintenance of liberty for others qualifies as such as pur
pose). Further, it incorporates a protection against inequalities
in rights or benefits when they disproportionately burden a dis
advantaged class (somewhat more tolerant of inequality than
Rawls, who permits it only when it benefits the disadvantaged
class).
Manipulation of reproductive decisions does infringe upon a
fundamental right. The right to procreate is grounded in both
personal liberty and the integrity of the family unit and is
viewed as fundamental to notions of ordered liberty and justice
(Robertson, 1992, 1990, 1986, 1983). Although the Casey deci
sion abandons the language of "fundamental" rights with re
gard to abortion decisions, it does leave untouched—for the
moment—the line of cases implying that the decision to have a
child is fundamentally protected under the due process and lib
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erty clauses.10 And the grounding of this right in the earlytwentieth-century decisions concerning family autonomy (such
as parental control over childhood education) argues in favor of
interpreting the right to procreate as not only the right to have
children but also the right to make some choices about what
kind of children one will have (Robertson, 1986, 1983).
Given, then, that reproduction holds an exalted place among
implicit constitutional rights, can state interests in reducing the
number of children born with genetic disorders pass muster?
Most means to promote this goal will impair women's repro
ductive freedom. Even mandatory screening laws impose a bur
den. They require individuals to learn things about themselves
they may have no wish to know and potentially threaten their
economic security by putting them at risk of social stigmatiza
tion as well as employment and insurance discrimination. These
laws can, in the end, have a chilling effect on the exercise of the
right to procreate. Past experience coupled with pilot projects
on cystic fibrosis carrier screening in the United Kingdom and
the United States demonstrate that such screening efforts will
be directed primarily at women rather than at men or at couples
(U.S. Congress, 1992). Thus, even mandatory screening pro
grams place a burden on the exercise of a fundamental right by
women, a group that is historically disadvantaged.11 If states
wish to reduce the purported burden of genetic disorders, the
goal must be compelling and the means chosen must be the
most effective and the least restrictive possible. The implemen
tation of mandatory screening fails to meet these criteria.
The goal of reducing genetic disorder in the population may
be founded upon several propositions. First, it may reflect an
economic concern that genetic disorder is costly. Second, it may
reflect a desire to reduce human suffering. Third, it may be part
of a teleological scheme for moving the population toward some
"better" level of species functioning. None of these goals, how
ever, is effectively served by screening laws, let alone by more
drastic or harsh measures. While genetic disorders impose costs
on the population through cost-sharing health and social wel
fare programs, they do not approach the costs incurred for
other disorders, including those caused by trauma (crime, acci
dent, workplace injury), undetected or untreated disease, and
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even illiteracy. Human suffering is far greater due to malnutri
tion, lack of shelter, and community violence than to relatively
rare genetic disorders. And improvement of the population's ca
pacity to engage in intellectually demanding work would take
place far more quickly via universal literacy than via the reduc
tion in the number of individuals with Down syndrome. State
interests in "improving" the population and reducing suffering
can be met far more effectively in areas having little or nothing
to do with reproductive decision-making.
Voluntary screening programs, whether directed at women
exclusively or not, offer a means of enhancing personal liberty
(by making it easier to make an informed choice about pro
creation) while simultaneously serving governmental objectives
that would otherwise go unmet. Mandatory education about
basic genetics and the availability of screening services, like hy
giene courses in high school, can empower women without ma
nipulating them. Focusing on the personal liberty of those mak
ing reproductive decisions, rather than on the dubious public
goal of eugenic cleansing of the gene pool, puts limits on the
techniques that can be used by the government to promote ge
netic screening or to penalize women who make unpopular de
cisions regarding procreation in the face of genetic risk. It puts
women's bodies back in the service of their own life goals,
rather than the service of the government's most immediate
objectives.

Conclusion
The Human Genome Project promises to vastly increase the
amount of knowledge available to us concerning the likely birth
outcomes of our children. History demonstrates that the state
will be sorely tempted to use that knowledge for eugenic pur
poses, employing the most interventionist methods possible, if
only because historically there has been little regard for women
making reproductive decisions on their own behalf and for their
own interests. Rather, women's reproductive decisions have con
sistently been viewed as being made for the benefit of others,
whether their husbands, their families, or the state. Yet since
women will inevitably be the main targets of genetic informa
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tion, screening, and planning, as well as the primary caretakers
of those born with genetic disorders, justice dictates that in
creased freedom of action accompany this increased degree of
responsibility. That freedom includes adequate information
about the availability of genetic testing, sensitive counseling and
guidance in its use, and equal support for pregnancy termina
tion or continuation.
It is essential that we take advantage of the current state of
constitutional law that has allowed pro-natalist aspects of repro
ductive freedom to rise to the level of a fundamental right. With
this official nod from the Supreme Court, it is possible to resist
most state interventions on the basis that they unduly burden
unfettered exercise of this right. Overall, it is worth remember
ing that we do not owe our children or our children's children
an endless sacrifice of personal interests. Intergenerational jus
tice dictates that we leave future generations no worse off than
we are ourselves. While we might aspire to more, we cannot
demand it.
In the end, the legal response to expanded reproductive ge
netic testing will determine who controls the technology. The
assumptions we make, for example, about causing or prevent
ing harm may well affect the development of relevant law. To
the extent that women's choices, autonomous or otherwise, are
viewed as "causing" harm, those choices will be subject to sig
nificant limitation. If the passage of a deleterious gene from a
parent to a child is considered "causing" harm, then women's
decisions about genetic screening and pregnancy termination
could well be the subject of state interest. On the other hand, if
these are viewed as decisions simply not to "prevent" harm, the
decisions are more likely to be left unfettered. Of course, the
biggest risk in the light of expanded opportunities for genetic
testing is the development of an affirmative duty to prevent all
avoidable harms to future children from whatever cause. This
is exactly the sort of theory used in numerous forced caesarean
and fetal protection policy cases.
Both providers and consumers must recognize there are lim
its on control over reproduction and the duty to rescue mem
bers of the next generation from the results of the genetic lot
tery. The expansion of genetic testing may give the impression
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we can and should take complete control and responsibility for
the results of birth. But in the end we must recognize that con
ditions beyond our knowledge or grasp may cause results that
we cannot control. Law cannot change this biological reality.
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